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 Abstract:  Practitioners and theorists have documented the benefi ts of user engage-
ment and participation in evaluation and, at the same time, the value of neutral 
and impartial evaluative evidence. Yet producing both an independent and inclusive 
evaluation is a leading challenge in our fi eld. In this practice note, we present one 
solution. We describe the design of an evaluation governance structure that was used 
to fi nd balance between these two themes. We also identify key elements of this ex-
perience and present these for adaptation by others, given appropriate tailoring. We 
have documented our experience as we believe that governance provides currently 
uncharted potential for this discipline spanning challenge. 
 Keywords:  evaluation governance, evaluation management, independence, over-
sight, participation 
 Résumé : Les spécialistes et les théoriciens ont documenté les avantages de la 
participation des utilisateurs en évaluation et, de la même façon, la valeur de 
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données d’évaluation neutres et impartiales. Il reste que réaliser une évaluation 
aussi indépendante qu’inclusive est encore un défi  de taille dans notre domaine. 
Dans la présente note de pratique, nous présentons une solution. Nous décrivons 
le design d’une structure d’évaluation de la gouvernance qui a servi à trouver un 
équilibre entre les deux thèmes. Nous nommons aussi les éléments clés de cette 
expérience et expliquons comment ils peuvent être adaptés pour répondre à des 
besoins particuliers. Nous avons documenté notre expérience puisque nous croyons 
que la gouvernance est une avenue prometteuse pour relever ce défi  qui touche de 
nombreuses disciplines. 
 Mots clés : gouvernance en évaluation, gestion de l’évaluation, indépendence, sur-
veillance, participation 
 INTRODUCTION 
 Th is practice note aims to detail the management and oversight process that was 
used to govern the 2015 summative evaluation of the Development Innovation 
Fund—Health (DIF-H), a consortium eff ort of Canada’s International Develop-
ment Research Centre (IDRC), Grand Challenges Canada (GCC), and the Ca-
nadian Institutes of Health Research (CIHR). We believe it will be of interest to 
evaluators, evaluation managers and commissioners, and organizational leaders 
who are interested in governance models for evaluation. Stakeholders require 
timely and actionable results for implementation, particularly where independ-
ence and accountability are important objectives of evaluation. As a practice note, 
this manuscript describes a record of experience that we present for critique, de-
bate, or inspiration. Its purpose is not to provide generalizable research evidence. 
 Readers of this journal will know that producing independent and useful 
evaluations is an ongoing challenge that requires continuous attention. We have 
co-craft ed this practice note with two objectives in mind. 1 First, it is the output 
of an aft er-action review process to advance our own learning and improvement 
agendas ( National Aeronautics and Space Administration, 2016 ;  Overseas Devel-
opment Institute, 2009 ). Second, it is meant to ensure that what we perceive as 
a successful attempt at addressing this challenge is documented and shared with 
others who may fi nd themselves in similar circumstances. 
 Th e desire to share this experience was also driven by the fact that the evalu-
ation of the DIF-H, while involving a federal agency and a Crown corporation 
of the Government of Canada, was not required to be undertaken using the ap-
proach outlined in the Treasury Board’s Policy on Evaluation (now the Policy on 
Results). Th is provided some leeway in exploring new approaches to managing 
evaluations, while also considering some of the fundamental principles upon 
which federal evaluations rest. 
 Th is practice note begins with an introduction to the DIF-H (the object of 
evaluation) and the context in which the evaluation took place. Next, we introduce 
the concepts of independence and inclusion as central themes and challenges 
to evaluation management, highlighting our reasons for attempting to address 
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these themes through internal-external governance. Th e third section outlines 
the internal-external governance approach and how it was implemented. Finally, 
we provide self-refl ection from all members of the governance committees. We 
note what we thought worked well and areas we would improve in a second go. 
We conclude the practice note by off ering some remarks to others who may also 
consider applying this approach, with appropriate adaptation. 
 The Development Innovation Fund—Health 
 Th e Government of Canada established the DIF-H in 2008. As announced in that 
year’s federal budget, the fund aimed to “support the best minds in the world as 
they search for breakthroughs in global health and other areas that have the po-
tential to bring about enduring changes in the lives of millions of people in poor 
countries” ( Government of Canada, 2008 ). With a budget of $225 million over 
seven years, the DIF-H implements this complex mission by providing fi nancial, 
and other forms of, support to competitively selected proposals from Canadian 
and low- and middle-income country researchers who present bold and innova-
tive ideas that address humanity’s most diffi  cult health challenges. 
 A three-party consortium implemented the DIF-H. It includes IDRC, the 
CIHR, and GCC. Each plays a discrete role. GCC is a purpose-built, not-for-profi t 
organization directed by the Government of Canada to be the DIF-H implemen-
tation arm, responsible for the delivery of the identifi ed policy priorities and the 
monitoring and evaluation of the funded projects. Th e CIHR, Canada’s national 
health research funding agency, is responsible for organizing the competitive sci-
entifi c peer review of applications to the fund. IDRC, a Crown corporation of the 
Government of Canada, is responsible for advising the Canadian government on 
the progress of the DIF-H, disbursing funds to GCC, and managing the evaluation 
and oversight of the DIF-H as a whole (see  Figure 1 ). Since it is not the purpose of 
this practice note to describe the DIF-H or the concept of Grand Challenges for 
Development, we encourage interested readers to review the website of GCC and 
IDRC to learn more about the DIF-H, and the Grand Challenges for Development 
website to learn more about the global Grand Challenges eff ort. 2 
 Figure 1.  The DIF-H Consortium Model 
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 The context of the evaluation 
 Responsibility for the management of the evaluation of the DIF-H was directed 
to IDRC by the Treasury Board Secretariat of Canada through a memorandum 
of Cabinet. A specifi c requirement was that a summative evaluation would be 
completed to provide the Government of Canada with a view of the DIF-H’s per-
formance and results. Early meetings with senior government offi  cials stressed the 
importance of rigour and strict independence of the evaluation. As such, IDRC 
concluded that the evaluation should be commissioned by an external evalua-
tor, based outside of Canada, with no prior affi  liation to the DIF-H or any of its 
consortium members, with a reputation for evaluation excellence, in addition to 
expertise in innovation and health. 
 At the same time, since IDRC, GCC, and CIHR follow closely the concept of 
evidence-based decision making, they understand that the apt use of evidence is 
time dependent ( Pawson 2006 ). In this context, waiting for external recommen-
dations for action was not ideal. As such, during the inter-consortium evaluation 
planning meetings, a desire became clear that we wanted to do all we could to 
ensure that the themes of independence and summative judgment that were now 
driving the evaluation would not undermine the production of accessible and 
actionable evidence. Moreover, we also wanted to make sure that this evidence 
would reach the consortium members in relatively real time and in the right learn-
ing spaces (for example, appropriate levels of management, appropriate decision-
making moments, and so on). Th us was born our aspirational goal to weave the 
themes of independence (for accountability) and inclusiveness (for utility and 
real-time use) through the fabric of the evaluation process. Th e fi nal DIF-H evalu-
ation report can be viewed in the Open Access Digital Library of IDRC and is 
available on the webpage of GCC ( Oxford Policy Management, 2015 ). 3 
 DESCRIPTION OF EVALUATION MANAGEMENT FOR 
INDEPENDENCE AND INCLUSIVENESS 
 At a minimum, an independent evaluation is one in which the evaluator(s) “are 
not beholden to those who designed and implemented the intervention” ( Morra 
Imas & Rist, 2009 , p. 32;  Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Develop-
ment, 2002 ). Bias or partiality on behalf of the evaluator risks undermining the 
credibility, reliability, quality assurance, and ethics of his or her work regardless 
of whether the lack of independence is real or merely perceived ( Picciotto, 2008 ). 
 Yet, independence is not the only factor in evaluation, as was the case for the 
DIF-H, where utility and relevance to stakeholders were also important. In fact, 
the concept of independence can seem to be at odds with utility as utilization-
focused evaluations encourage the evaluator to engage with evaluation users—
oft en the very people that have designed and implemented the intervention—
to better ensure a usable and relevant evaluation ( International Development 
Research Centre, 2012 ). Th e inclusion of end-users and their considerations 
throughout the evaluation is premised on the idea that the involvement of primary 
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 Figure 2.  Governance as a Balancing Fulcrum 
users is central to producing an evaluation conducive to learning and the applica-
tion of that learning ( International Development Research Centre, 2012 ;  Patton, 
2008 ). Th is inclusion can result in a (real or perceived) tension for evaluators as 
they must navigate between the safeguarding of their independence and the de-
velopment of a useful and actionable end product. We contended, however, that 
a balance could be facilitated between independence and inclusiveness if an ap-
propriate governance structure was established to act as a fulcrum (see  Figure 2 ). 
 Despite the wealth of literature dedicated to the broad concept of manage-
ment ( Compton, 2009 ), there is a lack of work focused on the management of 
evaluations ( Baizerman & Compton, 2009 ;  Compton, 2009 ). Th is literature gap 
presents both a challenge and an opportunity. On the one hand, there is little ex-
perience to draw on to inform governance structures for managing evaluations. 
On the other hand, such a situation demands creativity. 
 Th e literature on advisory groups is a starting point in understanding how 
governance procedures can play a role in evaluation management. An advisory 
group’s role can diff er depending on the scope and nature of an evaluation, but 
they are generally established to provide feedback throughout the evaluation 
process, based on their expertise ( Baizerman, Fink, & Roholt, 2012 ;  Compton, 
Baizerman, & Roholt, 2010 ). Th ese contributions can include social and political 
insights to assist in understanding context; however, these insights are non-binding 
as advisory groups generally do not have governing authority over evaluations 
( Baizerman, Fink, & Roholt, 2012 ). Advisory groups can therefore bring fun-
damental contextual considerations and subject area expertise to an evaluation. 
 Similar to advisory groups, steering committees can be used in evaluation 
as part of the governance structure. Most common in multi-partner evaluations 
of international cooperation initiatives, steering committees have “a broad mem-
bership of all interested partners” and are characterized by a complex group of 
stakeholders with divergent interests ( Dabelstein & Kliest, 2013 , p. 42). For the 
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DIF-H, IDRC desired the contextual knowledge and input of consortium mem-
bers to guide the evaluation toward an accurate and useful result. At the same 
time, IDRC could not tolerate interference or the perception of interference in 
the evaluation (including from IDRC itself) as full external independence of the 
evaluation was a formal requirement of the Government of Canada. Since no 
model was immediately available to us in the literature or practice record, IDRC 
devised the approach to governance using a dual committee, as described below. 
 OVERVIEW OF THE PRACTICE IMPLEMENTED: DUAL 
COMMITTEE (INTERNAL-EXTERNAL) GOVERNANCE 
 To practically address the challenge of blending independence and inclusiveness 
into the DIF-H summative evaluation, IDRC developed an evaluation manage-
ment plan that embedded both themes directly into the governance structure 
of the evaluation. It is important to note that this management plan was clearly 
detailed and socialized with the consortium members and with the primary 
evaluation user, the Government of Canada ( International Development Research 
Centre, 2015 ), all of whom supported the approach. Since IDRC was ultimately 
responsible for the DIF-H evaluation, the governance structure was developed 
with the purpose of supporting IDRC in its evaluation management role. Th e 
goal was to ensure that any oversight upheld an open process and also ensured 
that the independent evaluator was not “captured” by the consortium or any of its 
members ( Laff ont & Tirole, 1991 ). 4  
 To achieve this, the governance structure comprised two discrete commit-
tees, with distinct roles and responsibilities. IDRC labelled these two groups: the 
DIF-H Evaluation Committee and the DIF-H External Oversight Committee. In 
our implementation, the two committees did not meet directly with each other. 
Instead, information was shared via recorded meeting minutes and formal records 
of decision. 
 The DIF-H Evaluation Committee 
 Th e DIF-H Evaluation Committee was charged with the regular discussion of 
issues pertinent to the evaluation. Chaired by the Evaluation Offi  ce of IDRC, 
the committee was composed of senior level representatives of each consortium 
member. In plain terms, the membership of this committee had a vested interest 
in the DIF-H. Th e terms of reference of the committee outlined that it would meet 
at a minimum of four critical check-in points: 
 1.  at the evaluation initiation to discuss the management approach and 
committee roles and responsibilities; 
 2.  at the evaluation design stage to discuss the evaluation approach pre-
sented by the external evaluator; 
 3.  at the fi ndings stage to react and respond fi rst hand to evaluation fi nd-
ings before formal public reporting; and 
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 4.  at the evaluation conclusion to contribute to the management response 
and action plan, which were written by the consortium to address the 
recommendations of the evaluation. 
 However, the committee met more oft en than this, as it served as an ad hoc 
meeting place for discussions regarding the progress of the evaluation and the 
related business required of each consortium member—for example, data ac-
cess for the evaluator and the scheduling of data collections activities. As such, it 
allowed for appropriate engagement between the necessarily external evaluator 
and the consortium members in an open and transparent way, as all consortium 
members were to be present for interactions (see  Table 1 ). 
 Th e DIF-H Evaluation Committee also created a learning and discussion 
space for consortia members. Via the committee, the process results and early 
fi ndings of the evaluation were shared with each agency in a timely manner. Th is 
timing allowed for an early discussion of the emergent issues and for agency im-
plementation or reaction to information coming from the evaluation in relatively 
real time. Nevertheless, at all times, the committee remained a discussion forum, 
playing an advisory role to the independent evaluator and the External Oversight 
Committee. 
 The External Oversight Committee 
 Th e External Oversight Committee was charged with decision making by the pro-
cess of consensus on critical evaluation issues. It comprised three external subject 
area experts, who were deemed to be independent of any consortium member. To 
elect members to the committee, the President/Chief Executive Offi  cer of each 
consortium member nominated an external representative, although each agency 
was granted veto rights on any other agency’s nomination. Once elected, committee 
members were asked to sign a declaration of their independence from the DIF-H or 
any consortium member, including their nominating agency. Th is process ensured 
that no evaluation “decision maker” on this committee held a vested interest in a 
positive or negative outcome of the evaluation. Th e committee was chaired by a 
non-voting representative of the IDRC’s Evaluation Offi  ce (see  Table 2 ). 
 Th e terms of reference dictated that the committee would be convened at a 
minimum of three decision-making points: 
 Table 1.  The DIF-H Evaluation Committee 
Chair – Head of Evaluation, IDRC
Membership:
      • CIHR – Chief Audit and Evaluation Executive
      • GCC – Vice-President Operations and General Counsel
      • IDRC – Senior Program Specialist in Evaluation
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 1.  to select the evaluator, by reviewing applications and applying their ex-
pert judgment against the criteria of evaluator ability for the job as well 
as feasibility and rigour of the proposed approach submitted within the 
evaluation; 
 2.  to approve the evaluation design, by applying their expert judgment in 
examining the evaluator’s detailed methodology report and the DIF-H 
Evaluation Committee’s minutes; and 
 3.  to approve the fi nal evaluation report, by applying their expert judgment 
to review the report of the external evaluator while keeping in mind the 
utility needs and views of the DIF-H consortia articulated in the DIF-H 
Evaluation Committee’s minutes. 
 An additional benefi t of the External Oversight Committee was the criti-
cal review it provided to the evaluation. Th e feedback and technically informed 
commentary that the committee provided—at the planning, design, analysis, and 
reporting stages—improved the quality of the evaluation well beyond the inde-
pendence that it engendered. 
 KEY LESSONS LEARNED AND HIGHLIGHTS 
 Th e dual committee process yielded the successful completion of the summative 
evaluation. In the view of the primary evaluation user, the evaluation was a useful 
decision-making tool not only because of the quality and utility of the evidence 
produced but also because of the independent perspective it provided. In the fol-
lowing sections, we highlight some key learning from the process. 
 Independence does not imply isolation 
 Th e conventional view of independent evaluation relies mainly on a variety of 
mechanisms to separate the evaluator and the evaluand. Reducing interference 
and capture with these approaches provides the benefi t of independence, but it 
has the disadvantage of a loss of utility (and, arguably, accuracy) via participation. 
We believe the governance process used in the DIF-H evaluation is a productive 
 Table 2.  The External Oversight Committee 
Chair – Head of Evaluation, IDRC (non-voting member)
Membership:
      •  Executive Director Performance Management and Evaluation, Alberta Innovates 
Health Solutions – Health Research Evaluation Expertise (CIHR nominee)
      •  Program Offi  cer, Robert Wood Johnson Foundation – Innovative Health 
Programming and Evaluation Expertise (GCC nominee)
      •  Partner, PRA Inc.; Past President Canadian Evaluation Society – Evaluation and 
Canadian Federal Context Expertise (IDRC nominee)
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means of approaching this challenge, as it allows stakeholder participation in 
evaluator guidance and real time and structured interaction between the two, 
while ensuring independence via external oversight. In simple terms, we external-
ized oversight and not the evaluation.
 In addition, the experience related to the external oversight committee pro-
vided new insights on the notion of neutrality. Typically, as is the case with the cur-
rent federal Policy on Results, neutrality implies safeguarding an evaluation process 
from negative impacts (real or perceived) that could derive from relationships or 
interests or from preconceived ideas, prejudices, or biases. While this fi rst layer of 
neutrality is critical in practical terms, evaluations also involve multiple considera-
tions framed by previous experiences, time frames, budgets, or personal expecta-
tions. Th ese preconceived notions, while not raising any moral issues in themselves, 
may sway some key decisions during the various stages of an evaluation. Since it is 
fi rmly grounded in the realm of applied research, evaluations do require multiple 
trade-off s and compromises, which must be managed in such a way as to ensure that 
the end result still satisfi es the information needs of its intended users. Having the 
External Oversight Committee provided a more detached perspective, less framed 
by these practical considerations and limitations and more focused on the overall 
purpose of the evaluation. Th is has proven particularly benefi cial since the External 
Oversight Committee acted as a decision-making body, having essentially a veto on 
all key stages of the evaluation. In this sense, the External Oversight Committee’s 
views could not simply be considered; they had to be satisfactorily addressed. In our 
view, this created a benefi cial dynamic. 
 One notable challenge relates to the communication between the two com-
mittees. We elected to facilitate communication via written minutes rather than 
direct dialogue. Th is approach favoured independence and, even more so, the 
perception of independence, but it did not adversely aff ect the Evaluation Com-
mittee members’ (vested stakeholders) ability to engage productively and fairly. 
Although this process was agreed to have been impartial and constructive, we 
note that both Evaluation Committee members and External Oversight Commit-
tee members concurred that there might have been alternative benefi ts derived 
from direct interaction. 
 Value in consultation 
 In our case, the regular interaction between the evaluation stakeholders and the 
evaluator was found to be an active ingredient of success. Th e two-way fl ow of 
information (between the consortium and the evaluator and vice-versa) allowed 
the evaluator to be better informed and the evaluation results to be more targeted, 
accurate, and useful. Our process adds to the body of literature and practice af-
fi rming this outcome. Nevertheless, it was not always easy. Formally structuring 
evaluator–evaluand interactions through a committee required planning and ef-
fort. We had to be much more adaptive than planned to ensure that the timing was 
right for input from Evaluation Committee members. Now concluded, we con-
tend that the four stages (planning, design, fi ndings, and conclusion) earmarked 
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for interaction were appropriate and necessary, but, in practice, the committee 
emerged as a much more ad hoc meeting place and fl exible entity than originally 
planned. We would encourage this too. 
 Th e unexpected benefi t of consultation came from the External Oversight 
Committee. Although these representatives were selected for subject matter ex-
pertise, the productive insight they provided, at critical stages, was more instru-
mental than was expected and planned at the outset of our process. For example, 
at the evaluation design stage, the External Oversight Committee went beyond 
rejection or approval of the evaluator’s protocol (their mandate), providing signifi -
cant expert insight on the framing of the evaluation study for a positive reception 
by our primary intended user. Th is input was fed back to the Evaluation Commit-
tee and the evaluator and was certainly a contributor to the successful reception of 
the evaluation and its eventual use. Another advantage of the committee was that 
all advice was from “outside the consortium box.” We learned that fresh perspec-
tive was useful not only for independence but also for innovation. 
 Good governance requires resources 
 Th e dual committee process required resources in the shape of extra time on the 
part of the evaluation manager (IDRC), the evaluator, and the committee mem-
bers themselves. Of course, this time required fi nancial compensation, so the 
process ate into the overall evaluation budget and the voluntary time committed 
by External Oversight Committee members. Th e clear position of IDRC as the 
“secretariat” managing the two committees likely eased the resource burden in 
total through the reduction of transaction costs, but it did require extraordinary 
attention from IDRC with respect to the evaluation. Th erefore, we have noted 
clearly that there was a resource allocation trade-off  between other evaluation 
activities and evaluation governance activities. In our case, this was appropriate, 
independence and inclusion were paramount and so we invested in them. Doing 
so did not interfere with the production of a quality evaluation. Others should 
consider this decision in their own context. 
 IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE EVALUATION PRACTICES 
 Th e dual committee (internal-external) governance described in this manuscript 
was judged to be a success by all parties involved—users, evaluators, and internal 
and external governors alike. In short, independence and inclusion were appro-
priately balanced to suit the needs of the evaluation user and also to benefi t the 
evaluation stakeholders. Th is being said, we do not argue that replication in dif-
ferent contexts would necessarily yield the same results.  
 From our experience, the conditions to support successful implementation 
would include: 
 • careful construction of committee membership;  
 • clear communication of committee roles and responsibilities;  
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 • transparency of committee activities; 
 • appropriate resourcing; and  
 • an enabling environment that was willing to support the process.  
 Under these conditions, we estimate that this model can be adapted by others seeking both 
independence and inclusion in an evaluation. Adaptation is emphasized since we strongly 
believe that contextual tailoring would be essential. Th e approach is not a blanket solution. 
Considerations of values, objectives, and the supporting conditions outlined above (at a 
minimum) should be thoughtfully reviewed before implementation. Nevertheless, gov-
ernment, international agencies, and philanthropy provide settings that we believe could 
benefi t from the process we have outlined in this practice note. 
 NOTES 
 1  Th e authorship structure of this practice note is important. We each held a diff ering role 
in the management, oversight, and eventual use of the DIF-H summative evaluation. 
Co-authoring this practice note allowed an iterative refl ection space to emerge, and we 
approached this note as a documentation of our aft er-action review. Th e process allowed 
for fair input from the various actors involved. Th e process was independently facilitated. 
Co-authorship has empowered each of us independently and our group as a whole. 
 2  Respectively, these are Grand Challenges Canada,  http://www.grandchallenges.ca ; In-
ternational Development Research Centre,  http://www.idrc.ca ; and Grand Challenges, 
 http://www.grandchallenges.org . 
 3  Specifi cally, International Development Research Centre,  IDRC Digital Library ,  http://
idl-bnc.idrc.ca/dspace/ ; Grand Challenges Canada,  Evaluations ,  http://www.grandchal-
lenges.ca/who-we-are/evaluations . 
 4  Laff ont and Tirole (1991) outline a concept of “capture” in which a public agency is 
coerced by a group or individual who has high stakes interest in the decisions and ac-
tions of the public agency and, therefore, invests resources into achieving control over 
the public entity or particular actions it takes. In economics jargon, this is known as a 
form of “government failure.” Th e fi eld of public choice economics has built a large body 
of empirical and theoretical literature on this topic. 
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